Nineties and Dulat’s Book- Reading Between Lines?

PUNCHLINE

Behind The Lid Off

Z.G. Muhammad

Memoirs are important for telling the whole story about political struggles.  Not only the memoirs of the major dramatis personae involved in the struggles are important for the narratives of the struggling nations but even stories told by those involved in subverting these struggles help in telling the whole story. True, there are instances like, ‘A Million Little Pieces’ by James Frey promoted and sold as memoirs later discovered as works of fiction or semi-fiction.

For telling the whole story of post- 1947 Kashmir, I see memoirs like, ‘Kashmir War of 1947-48: Slender was the Thread’, by Brigadier L. P. Sen,  ‘Nehru’s emissary to Kashmir by Major General Hira Lal Atal, or ‘Kargil, From Surprise to Victory’ by General V. P Malik as important source material for Kashmir story. Memoirs of spy-masters like B.N. Mullik, ‘My Days with Nehru- Kashmir’ or A. S. Dulat, ‘Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years with all scepticism do provide some slit to peep into some behind the scene developments that did have had an adverse  impact on the political struggle of people of Jammu and Kashmir.

There can be no denying there are always elements of fiction in such memoirs but a sharp student of history by juxtaposing the memoirs with the political situation obtaining during the period can chaff truth from the falsehood.  Kashmir: the Vajpayee years might be suffering from some inaccuracies, some distortion and it may have some elements of fiction in it but it cannot be dismissed as trash. It does provide an insight into New Delhi’s machinations and tactics in looking for ‘collaborators’ and ‘willing partners’ from combatants and political leaders, who were ostensibly in the vanguard after 1989 for undermining the people’s movement. To understand the purpose behind and the real import and impact of New Delhi’s machinations in seeking collaboration of dramatis personae the book needs to be read in a certain perspective.

In forty two years history after landing of army on 27 October 1947 at Srinagar airport, the GOI in 1989, 1990 and after was facing first ever serious challenge in Kashmir. Much more serious than it had faced during the 1964 Holy Relic Movement. The 1964 movement had put state administration out of gear and sent the ruling elite in to hiding. In 1989, for the first time, the GOI’s institutions in Kashmir had not only been unnerved but teared apart. Many had crumbled like a pack of cards. Even most powerful wanted to pack and go. Talking about fear of getting lynched by people at the Duj Nath RAW chief’s residence in Barazalla along with six others Dulat  writes, “During that killing spree of I.B. officers there came a day when I was sort of gheraoed by my IB colleagues in my office. The staff came out, all twenty of them, and they then told me that they felt insecure in Srinagar. What happened was all the central government employees had run away from Kashmir that winter; they had disappeared, leaving behind nobody. The only people left were IB. The staff said, we are the only one’s left and place is not secure”.(P63) This situation speaks volumes.

The major setback to New Delhi’s interests in the state was running away of political leaders and workers of parties like the National Conference and Pradesh Congress. The fast changing political scenario and developments had given a sense of victory to people and they were looking for their new heroes amongst the combatants. The long fights put by combatants largely changed the psychology of people whose marshal spirit had been drained during four hundred years alien rule. The changed public psyche was another major challenge for powers that be- if the urban guerrilla warfare does not throw up strong leaders like Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh or Ahmed Ben Bella with international personality. Targeting and winning over the potential commanders became the task.

On diplomatic front, after 1962, China War Kashmir was for the first   time posing a greater challenge to New Delhi.    Once again Kashmir had taken a central place in the United States South-Asia policy. Ms. Robin Raphel was councillor of Political Affairs in US Embassy in New Delhi actively interacted with the various groups in Jammu & Kashmir and more prominently with the Hurriyat Conference. Stating US policy about Kashmir in a statement she had said, “We view Kashmir as a disputed territory and that means that we do not recognize that instrument of accession as meaning that Kashmir is forevermore an integral part of India.” Despite, New Delhi crying hoarse Washington did not distance itself from her statement but more than once stated it was consistent with the Washington’s formal position on Kashmir dispute. She articulated the same views about US policy towards Kashmir, after taking over as Assistant Secretary of State during the Clinton Administration. The State Department regularly issued assessment about Kashmir situation. These assessments coupled with congressional testimonies, and reports by the human rights organizations had put New Delhi internationally in a tight corner.

New Delhi adopted a multi-pronged strategy for taking wind out of sails of the movement and defeating Kashmir Dispute regaining primacy as an unsettled dispute.  For neutralizing the urban guerrillas it used “catch and Kill” policy and created counter-insurgent outfits.  To establish contacts with combatant leaders and work on them it first used the human rights activists and journalists. Kuldip Nayar in his book ‘Beyond the Lines, tells us how he succeeded in his mission. New Delhi sent to Srinagar lots of interlocutors including some top intellectuals like Prof .A. M. Khusro with baskets of concessions, privileges and baits of power.   The ‘power-bait’, did attract some top leaders but with fear reigning supreme in their minds they often stumbled at the door step.  Dulat, writes in detail how the spymaster engaged some leaders with media-created larger than life image holding of bait of power in his hand. Seen in right perspective such engagements at a time when Kashmir was regaining its importance at international level were detrimental to the people’s movement- thus could be construed even betrayal with them. However, even scanty in information Dulat’s book needs to be debated ny political analyst dispassionately.