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Peace Watch » Editor's Take » Why I say 4pt formula was a sell out.

Why I say 4pt formula was a sell out.

Punchline
Talk From Ivory Towers?
Z. G. Muhammad

Eight years after its unceremonious burial four point formula of General Pervez is back in the news. The reason is not that it has found new takers on either side of the LOC. It has shot into headlines on television channels for former Pakistan Foreign Minister, Khurshid Ahmed using it for promoting sales of his newly released book, ‘Neither A Hawk Nor A Dove’. In this 850 page book, which is overwhelmingly a book on Pakistan’s foreign policy, there is one chapter on Kashmir dealing with the back channel activities between India and Pakistan during General Musharraf’s government. Kashmir continuing to be a hot subject for the media in the sub-continent, the author very wisely used the back channel engagement on the four point formula with all its contours between the two countries for promotion of his book in New Delhi and Islamabad.
Some commentators, on the basis of details provided by the author about progress made at back channel have started believing that a draft agreement between the two countries exits and the four point formula is ‘viable solution’ for resolution of the Kashmir. In fact, there is no breaking news in the newly released book, when we are told that substantial progress had been made at back channel and an agreement on the basis of the four point formula was on the anvil. In December 2007, an interview, NSA of India, M K Narayanan had stated, “India was doing business with Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf. I think there are things in the pipeline, things which are cooking, which are half cooked or three quarters cooked, which we would like to take forward.’ However, he had equally expressed his scepticism about Musharraf succeeding in convincing “the other power structures that have come up in addition to him that this is best thing for Pakistan?”
It is historical reality, after Agra Summit debacle, Musharraf was groping in darkness. And after January 2006 meeting between him and Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, his climb down from Pakistan stated position on Kashmir started. After making boisterous statement that Pakistan would not ‘insist on settlement of Kashmir in accordance with the UN resolution’ he started talking about the four point formula for settling the Kashmir Dispute. The points that he talked about as solution of the Kashmir were not absolutely new but had been orchestrated in different forms in India, sometimes by individuals and sometimes think tanks in New Delhi. In early sixties, Lord Attlee and M.C. Rajagopalachari had proposed joint control over Foreign Affairs and Defence of Independent Jammu and Kashmir. Mr. Lakhanpal during same period had proposed a formula that has a lot of similarity with Musharraf formula as explained by Khurshid Kasuri. In nineties, when the Kashmir Dispute after a gap of over two decades had attracted international headlines. And for Kashmir having become a nuclear flash point, it had once again attracted attention of world leaders. India, as was articulated by some analysts like Pran Chopra feared third party mediation. It was at this juncture, the idea of “joint management” was mooted in New Delhi. The formula talked about India and Pakistan retaining present sovereignties over their respective side of the state, joint working between two sides of the state…. elections for credible representatives through fair, credible and transparent process. Followed by cooperation at the state level by representatives of two sides… and as the cooperation at the two levels grow Kashmir Dispute will come to an end, neither India nor Pakistan feeling that it has lost its side on Kashmir to the other country’. (India Pakistan and the Kashmir Tangle by Pran Chopra published by Harper Collins 1994 pages 37-43). In his series of articles published in Dawn, Eqbal Ahmed after a couple of years also discussed and debated similar ideas and strongly pleaded for porous borders between the two parts of the State and suggested joint management.
Looking in the backdrop of earlier proposals in public domain at the proposal of ‘joint management’, debated and deliberated upon at the back channel by Islamabad and New Delhi, there is nothing new in what Kasuri writes about it. The Joint Mechanism consisting of elected members from both the sides’, which he talks about raises more question than it answers.’ The big question that come to mind, under what authority, would such an election be held in the state. To my understanding, with sovereignty continuing to be with India, elections on our side would continue to be held under the Election Commission of India.
He writes about agreement at back channel about demilitarization, this in no way was aimed at withdrawal of troops of both the countries from the state or from the 750 Km long LOC, with over more than two million people living on both the sides of the line but reducing foot prints of army in the civilian areas in Kashmir- a situation as obtained before 1989.
Had the two governments signed the agreement, which Kasuri makes us to believe had been arrived at. Could, such an agreement, which in reality was nothing but maintaining status quo and a compromise on people’s fundamental right been acceptable to the people- to use his phrase ‘struggle fatigued’ Kashmiris.
It is true, that some former Pakistan diplomats, journalists and columnists, who are comfortable with New Delhi continue to harp on the four point formula but many a seasoned Pakistan diplomats and writers believe it would have been a sell out. Writing on Musharraf formula a former Foreign Secretary observed, “His cock eyed ideas were a sell out. Those proposals were not unworkable.” Former Pakistan Ambassador to United Nations Munir Akram commenting on the solution on the basis of four point wrote, “The ‘solution’ would have legitimized the status quo and forever forsaken the rights of the Kashmiris. Blissfully, it was spurned by India as Pakistan descended into political chaos after 2007.”
Can this  idea” that in reality is a betrayal of the fundamental that is right to self determination once again allure a section of  Kashmir leaders, is the question.

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